Fix the Link to Pakistan, Bond With India
WASHINGTON
— President Obama, who is visiting India this weekend, and India’s
prime minister, Narendra Modi, have both described their countries as
natural partners. That may be true. But they cannot achieve a deep and
strategic partnership until the United States deals more forthrightly
with Pakistan, New Delhi’s neighbor and nemesis.
In
other words, Washington must do more to address India’s anxieties about
Pakistan. But there is a conundrum. Washington should also not harm its
delicate and distrustful relationship with Islamabad.
Yes,
Pakistan harbors jihadist groups that threaten and kill Americans. But
it also sits astride the Middle East and Asia, boasts a large and young
population, and enjoys deep friendships with China and Saudi Arabia.
Diplomatic wisdom argues for staying on the good side of such a
strategically significant state.
In
effect, Washington needs to execute a delicate dance: Push back against
Pakistan in order to further America’s friendship with India, while
taking care not to alienate the Pakistanis.
A neat trick? Perhaps. But it can be done.
First,
America should stop giving free passes to the Pakistani military, which
receives billions of dollars’ worth of aid even as it sponsors militant
groups that murder Indians. An American law requires that the
government, before releasing security assistance, certify that
Pakistan’s armed forces have acted to stop Pakistan-based militants,
including anti-India groups. But in recent years, the Obama
administration has invoked national security waivers that bypass the
certification process. That should stop.
Insisting
on certification would show India that the White House holds Pakistan’s
military to some account. And Pakistan would probably pass. Last year
it launched a counterterrorism offensive in North Waziristan, and this
month it pledged to ban several militant groups operating on its soil;
together, those actions would probably allow Pakistan to attain
certification today, as it last did in 2011. Second, Washington should
help India guard against Pakistan-based terrorism. It should go beyond
placing bounties on top militant leaders, as it does now, but stop well
short of staging raids into Pakistan to seize them for transfer to
India. It should instead deepen its sharing of intelligence technology
with New Delhi to forestall attacks. Encouragingly, Mr. Obama’s visit
has been preceded by speculation about a deal involving surveillance
drones.
Washington
should also target overseas financial holdings of Pakistanis who
threaten India. One of India’s most wanted men, Dawood Ibrahim, is an
organized crime boss frequently seen in Karachi. According to the United
Nations, he funds the Pakistani militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba, which
attacked Mumbai in 2008. He is believed to hold assets in Dubai.
Washington should work with officials in the Persian Gulf to freeze
those assets.
Third,
the United States should try to steer Pakistan’s short-term focus away
from Kashmir and toward normalizing trade relations with India. Trade
negotiations have progressed in recent years, and Mr. Modi advocates
using commercial diplomacy to improve relations with neighbors. And
India would be relieved to hear less about Kashmir, an issue that is
nowhere near resolution.
Of
course, it would be a tough sell for Washington to persuade Pakistan
that the economic benefits of trade with India would far outweigh any
benefit possible from dwelling on Kashmir. But there may be no better
time to try, given the relatively relaxed current state of
American-Pakistani relations. Still, any efforts to reassure India must
be accompanied by nuanced American diplomacy, so as not to feed into the
“America and the world are out to get us” narrative that permeates
Pakistan.
The
United States should acknowledge Pakistan’s neuroses about India — a
nation perhaps seven times as populous and four times as large, with an
army twice as big and governed by a Hindu nationalist party known for
anti-Pakistan views. Americans should also take into account the
Pakistani contention (rejected by New Delhi) that India engages in
subversive activities in Pakistan (specifically, that it aids a
separatist insurgency in Baluchistan province). Pakistanis have not
forgotten India’s support for the secession of East Pakistan — now
Bangladesh — in 1971.
Of
course, any American plan that intensifies support to India is likely
to upset many Pakistanis, whose government has long demanded to be
treated as India’s equal. And any plan that aims not to offend Pakistan
would have detractors in India.
Realistically,
the United States is in no position to allay all of India’s fears about
Pakistan — in particular, Pakistan’s rapidly increasing nuclear weapons
stockpile. It also can’t end the Pakistani military-intelligence
establishment’s insistence on treating anti-India militants as useful
proxies. And it won’t succeed at coaxing Pakistan away from policies
that are driven by its belief, whether manufactured or real, that India
poses a direct threat. Washington should, however, press states that
enjoy more leverage with Pakistan — China, for example — to impress upon
Islamabad the need to rethink its bellicose posture. China needs
stability nearby, and its voice would resonate in Islamabad.
None
of these potential limitations should deter Americans from trying this
strategy. In fact, there are compelling reasons to push forward. With
its combat troops out of Afghanistan, America can relax its fixation on
pursuing deep relations with Pakistan, even while taking care not to
spoil the relationship, and feel freer to engage India more. Its
refocusing toward Asia, which envisions India as a counterbalance to
China, should have a similar effect.
So
helping New Delhi address its fears of Pakistan while engaging in
damage control with Islamabad would be a logical and timely policy — a
worthy goal for President Obama.
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